In this episode I speak with with Federica Paddeu, Professor and Derek Bowett Fellow in Law at Queen’s College, Faculty of Law, Cambridge University in England. We discuss her recent work on how best to understand the operation of consent as a justification for the use of force in international law—is it part of, or intrinsic to, the definition of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter? Or is it extrinsic, a separate and independent exception or justification for the use of force? Consider how consent operates quite differently in the crimes of rape (intrinsic to the definition) and battery (extrinsic defense). Our discussion makes clear that the answer to the question of how consent operates has important implications for how we think about and understand the nature of the use of force itself, on whether the prohibition in its entirety can be a jus cogens norm, as well as for how the justification ought to operate in practice. We end by also discussing her earlier work on self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness (work that will change how you understand that too), and how her thinking about exceptions and justifications in the jus ad bellum has evolved over the course of her intellectual journey. A fantastic conversation!
Materials:
– “Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons Against Force: Consent as a Justification for the Use of Force,” 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (2020) (SSRN version here).
– “Use of Force Against Non-State Actors and the Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness of Self-Defence,” 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 93 (2017).
– “Self-Defence as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness: Understanding Article 21 of the Articles of State Responsibility,” 85 British Yearbook of International Law 90 (2014).
Reading Recommendations:
– Katie Johnson, “Identifying the Jus Cogens Norms in the Jus ad Bellum,” 70 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2021).
– Andre de Hoogh, “The Compelling Law of Jus Cogens and Exceptions to Peremptory Norms: To Derogate or not to Derogate, That is the Question!” in Exceptions in International Law (Lorand Bartels and Federica Paddeu, eds., 2020).
– John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (2007).
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In this episode, I speak with
In this episode, I speak with
In this episode, I speak with
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In this episode, I speak with Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Professor of Law at the Universidad del Pacifico in Lima, Peru. We discuss his recent writing on the Latin American approaches to, and perspectives on, the jus ad bellum regime and principles of non-intervention. Drawing on a rich history of the Latin American response to the Monroe Doctrine and European approaches to intervention in the 19th Century, Alonso explains how the distinct Latin American perspectives developed, found expression in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, and contributed to the Latin American embrace of the U.N. system in 1946. He explains how a misunderstanding of the Latin American perspective leads to common misinterpretations of Latin American positions and responses to recent interventions, such as those in Syria, and debates over doctrinal issues, such as the validity of humanitarian intervention or the unwilling or unable doctrine. We round off our discussion by putting it all into the context of Third World approaches to international law. An eye-opening romp through history and theory!
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In Episode 5, I speak with